Hearing

This is a hearing of the Subcommittee on Aviation.

Official Transcript

Witnesses:

Daniel Elwell, Acting Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration; accompanied by Earl Lawrence, Executive Director Aircraft Certification, FAA | Written Testimony
The Honorable Robert L. Sumwalt, Chair, National Transportation Safety Board; accompanied by Dana Schulze Acting Director, Office of Aviation Safety, NTSB | Written Testimony

Opening remarks, as prepared, of Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Ranking Member Sam Graves (R-MO) and Subcommittee on Aviation Ranking Member Garret Graves (R-LA):

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Ranking Member Sam Graves (R-MO):

Thank you Chairman Larsen and Ranking Member Graves for holding this hearing.

I want to extend my condolences to the families and friends of the accident victims.  Their loss is why it is important we understand what occurred and what is needed to get the 737 MAX safely back in the air.

Safety is the highest priority, and we should and do regularly examine our safety programs.  

While we are early in the investigations, many appear to have already concluded that the FAA’s processes are to blame.  Should the various investigations reveal problems with the certification of the 737 MAX, Congress can and should act.  But any actions Congress or regulators consider must be based on facts, not a panicked desire to “do something.” 

I reviewed the Lion Air and Ethiopian preliminary accident reports and I feel strongly about sharing my thoughts with this committee based on my experience and perspective as a pilot with an ATP.

First, with Lion Air, there were flight control problems reported by pilots flying the same aircraft on the three days preceding the accident flight.  On the flight the day before the accident flight, the pilots experienced identical issues, yet flew more than an hour with the autopilot off and trimming the plane manually.  Unfortunately, it does not appear that they fully reported the problems.  Yet, based upon those reports, the aircraft was serviced and cleared for flight.

The preliminary accident report prepared by the Ethiopian authorities concludes that the pilots followed proper procedures, but there are several facts that contradict that conclusion.

First, the aircraft accelerated throughout the flight; the pilots never pulled back the throttles after setting them at full thrust for takeoff.  The aircraft actually accelerated to between 450 and 500 knots – far beyond the maximum certified speed of 340 knots.  That fundamental error appears to have had a domino effect on all the events that followed.

After an apparent faulty sensor caused the plane’s MCAS to angle the plane’s nose down, the pilots did follow the procedures by turning off the automated system and trying to manually trim the plane.  However, they were simply going too fast to manually level the plane – imagine trying to open a car door at 100 mph.

The pilots – both in their 20s and with less than 160 total hours combined flying a 737 MAX – then reactivated the automated system.  The plane went nose-down again, and the pilots were unable to recover.  No operating procedures that I know of direct a pilot to reactivate a faulty system.

The Lion Air and Ethiopian pilots desperately tried to save their passengers, but the facts in the preliminary reports reveal pilot error as a factor in these tragically fatal accidents.  To focus on a single possible cause fails to see the forest for the trees. 

Boeing is developing an MCAS software fix, but we can never eliminate every risk or anticipate all scenarios, no matter how much technology is in the cockpit.  Failures will occur.

The most important safety feature in any cockpit is a well-trained pilot.  Regardless of what the investigations conclude, airlines must ensure their pilots are sufficiently trained and experienced to handle the aircraft.  Pilots can master the cockpit’s technology, but they must be able to fall back on their training to fly the plane – not just fly a computer.

For me, the accident reports reaffirm my belief that pilots trained in the United States would have successfully handled the situation.  The reports compound my concerns about quality training standards in other countries.  That is why I asked the DOT Inspector General to look at international pilot training.

In the end, these facts are irrefutable: the U.S. aviation system is the world’s safest thanks to FAA’s leadership.  And despite sensational reports claiming the agency’s international standing is in question, the FAA remains the gold standard for safety. 

In the last decade in the United States, there have been nearly 7 billion passengers on 90 million flights, with only one fatality; this includes 57,000 flights of the 737 MAX.  One life lost is one too many, but that is a remarkable safety record.

One reason our system is safe is the collaborative process between FAA, pilots, manufacturers, airlines, and mechanics.  This decades-old structure has worked so well that last year, Congress overwhelmingly voted to uphold and improve the agency’s aircraft certification process.

I caution those who want to blame FAA’s process that jumping to conclusions only serves to erode confidence in the U.S. aviation system when the safety record speaks for itself.  While we have preliminary information, we do not have the final reports, nor the benefit of the investigative work yet to be completed.  What we do know does not justify abandoning FAA’s proven system that has made air travel the safest mode of transportation in history.

Subcommittee on Aviation Ranking Member Garret Graves (R-LA):

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling today’s hearing.

I want to express my condolences for the families and friends of those tragically lost in the two accidents.

As we know, the Boeing 737 MAX has been grounded in the United States since March 13, following its second international accident in five months.  While the accident investigations into both crashes continue, and other factors certainly contributed to those accidents, it is clear that the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) played a role in both accidents.  Boeing has announced that it is working on a software update to address issues with the MCAS, and we await its submission to the FAA for certification.

Multiple investigations into several different aspects of these accidents are underway, including by this Committee and the DOT Inspector General.  As those investigations continue, it is important to begin setting a record so that we can ensure that we learn from these accidents and make international aviation even safer.

We all say it so often that it’s almost trite, but safety is the top priority of the aviation industry and this subcommittee.

No one gets applause when a plane lands safely after an uneventful flight.  The safety baseline for commercial aviation is zero fatalities, zero accidents.  It took a long time to reach this level of safety; and sadly, many of our safety gains followed tragic accidents.  Any deviation from our current baseline means that we have to look at how the accident occurred and how to prevent it in the future.

But I want to be clear, the changes and reforms we make in the wake of these accidents must be based upon fact and must preserve the essence of an aviation system that has led to an era of unprecedented safety here in the United States.

Aviation accidents are the result of a series of events; there is never just one cause.

As we all know, the two 737 MAX accidents occurred in Indonesia and Ethiopia.  While we are reviewing the FAA’s certification processes, it is equally important that we look closely at the operations; maintenance programs; pilot experience requirements; and the pilot training programs of the two air carriers involved.  We need to understand the whole system, and whether the checks and balances and redundancies that are needed in any airline safety program were present and adhered to in these accidents.

Today is not an investigative hearing.  We are a long way from the final accident reports and completed investigations.  We are here today to learn more about our Nation’s response to these accidents and about what the next steps are before the Boeing 737 MAX returns to service.

I want to commend Acting Administrator Dan Elwell for his exemplary leadership during the past several months.  While we await the Senate’s confirmation of the President’s nominee to be the next FAA administrator, I know that FAA is in good hands.  I want to hear more from the witnesses about the various reviews and accident investigations, including the FAA’s Technical Advisory Board and Joint Authorities Technical Review.  But I also want it to be clear that, no matter what other countries say, I have complete confidence in the FAA’s aviation safety judgement.