Hearing

This is a hearing of the Subcommittee on Aviation.  For information about the previous hearing on this issue held on May 15, 2019, click here.

Opening remarks, as prepared, of Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Ranking Member Sam Graves (R-MO) and Subcommittee on Aviation Ranking Member Garret Graves (R-LA):

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Ranking Member Sam Graves (R-MO):

Thank you, Chairman Larsen and Ranking Member Graves, for holding this hearing.

I would also like to again express my condolences to the friends and families of the accident victims.

The focus of today’s hearing is how to safely return the 737 MAX to service.  This process must be careful and deliberative, and all involved must be laser-focused on safety.  I believe everyone at the FAA and Boeing understand that to do anything less is absolutely unacceptable.

We owe it to all those who tragically lost their lives to get this right.

As this process moves forward, input from stakeholders, both in the United States and around the world, is very important.  Today the Subcommittee will hear from some of those stakeholders.

As many of you know, as a pilot I am extremely proud of our aviation system in the U.S., and much of that pride stems from how safe our system has been.  Knowing how imperative it is that we maintain this record and reputation, I want to share some of my thoughts on safely ungrounding the 737 MAX.

First, the FAA’s process to certify the 737 MAX fix must be – and will be – intensive.  The FAA will conduct technical and operational reviews and assessments, simulator and flight testing, and evaluations and reevaluations.  They will also share information with, and consider comments and recommendations from, stakeholders.  Ultimately, I anticipate that the FAA will issue multiple notices, directives, and orders.

In addition, the Technical Advisory Board (TAB), with experts from the FAA, the U.S. Air Force, NASA, and the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center will conduct a parallel and independent review, and the FAA will consider their recommendations.

Boeing will need to demonstrate compliance with safety regulations and FAA directives.  U.S. airlines will also have to demonstrate compliance with FAA directives, and they will need to implement required training across their fleets.

Internationally, each country will make its own ungrounding decision, and the FAA will share information and provide assistance as requested.

I am glad that the FAA is working with international regulators towards finding consensus regarding the certification and return to service of the 737 MAX.

Second, the FAA is working with Boeing, airlines, pilots, and international regulators, and will determine what training will be required, both prior to the ungrounding and as recurrent training going forward. 

I believe it is critically important that we avoid focusing pilot training on the old MCAS system and what occurred in the two MAX accidents.  There is a real concern that training to the old system could result in negative training by unintentionally introducing or reinforcing outdated information or inapplicable concepts, which could actually decrease safety.

Third, it is vitally important that we allow the various investigations and reviews to run their course before we take legislative action.  To act preemptively would only be for optics – for people to be able to say we did something – rather than solving an identifiable problem in our system.

Aviation accidents rarely have one contributing factor.  There are a number of investigations looking at the certification of the 737 MAX, and if problems are found they must be addressed.  But, in reading the preliminary accident reports I, as well as many others with flying experience, have also raised concerns with pilot training, pilot experience, aircraft maintenance, and airline operations.  All of these issues must also be investigated and reviewed.

To ignore any possible factor or to jump to predetermined conclusions about those factors creates the risks of future accidents that could have been prevented by full and thorough investigations.

Finally, we must avoid politicizing aviation safety.  Safety is at the core of what every pilot, flight attendant, controller, engineer, repairman, manufacturer, inspector, operator, and regulator strives for each and every day.  It is the reason that in the last decade in the United States, there have been nearly 7 billion passengers on 90 million commercial flights, with only one fatality.  That is a heck of a record for the FAA and aviation community in the U.S. to be proud of.  Certainly, one life lost is one too many, but that unprecedented safety record is due to the safety culture of the aviation industry, which includes the collaborative, non-punitive approach to certification and safety oversight.  We must uphold that strong safety culture.

Over the next few months, the FAA and Boeing will be hard at work ensuring the safe return to service of the 737 MAX.  Their progress will be closely monitored not only by this committee but by the world.  But I can say without any hesitation that I believe the Acting Administrator of the FAA when he said, “the FAA will return the 737 MAX to service in the United States only when [it] determine[s], based on facts and technical data, that it is safe to do so.”

Thank you again for holding today’s hearing.

Subcommittee on Aviation Ranking Member Garret Graves (R-LA):

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling today’s hearing.

I also want to express my condolences to the families and friends of those lost in the two accidents, some of whom are with us today.  This is the second hearing that the Subcommittee has held on the Boeing 737 MAX, and we are closely following open investigations and the FAA and NTSB process for making key fixes.  Throughout this process we must stay focused on lessons learned, safety, and ensuring that this tragedy never repeats itself.

As has been said before, the United States has the strongest aviation safety record in the world. The reason we have such a safe system is that past Congresses and administrations of both parties have pushed partisanship aside and worked together to improve the safety of our system. 

When accidents happen, we must ask hard questions and demand that aviation stakeholders do the same.

The FAA is asking itself hard questions, as is Boeing.  We would be remiss if we didn’t expect airlines and pilot organizations to ask themselves similarly hard questions.

In addition to design and potential certification deficiencies, we have to understand why pilots facing similar challenging circumstances react in very different ways.  We have to take a look at industry assumptions on pilot responses and human-computer interfaces.  And we have to figure out whether global pilot training requirements adequately prepare pilots for all situations they may face, particularly when automated systems fail.

If we don’t work to understand these factors, we are not doing everything we can to keep the flying public safe.

We are all committed to ensuring that automated aircraft systems provide the safety benefits they are supposed to.  But when automation fails, a well-trained pilot must be prepared to respond.  By looking into all these issues, we can seek to avoid accidents relating to automation failures on other aircraft too.

At some point, the Boeing 737 MAX will fly again.  The FAA has laid out a rigorous and uncompromising process for the aircraft to go through before its return to service.  Based on what we know currently, we believe it will involve changes to the MCAS system and changes to training requirements.

We can all be confident that the FAA will only unground the 737 MAX when it is certain that Boeing has addressed any identified issue and that the aircraft is completely safe to fly.

I believe that Congress must be at least as meticulous and deliberative as the FAA in our efforts to figure out what went wrong and determine what our next steps are.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding today’s hearing.