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Press Release

Oberstar, Costello Release DOT-OIG Report on Lexington Crash

Verbal guidance on tower staffing not uniformly followed

March 20, 2007

  The Chairman of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Aviation today released a report on a control tower staffing issue that arose after the crash of a Comair passenger jet in Lexington, Kentucky last year.

On August 27, 2006, Comair Flight 1191, wandered onto the wrong runway while taxiing for takeoff from Lexington’s Blue Grass airport. The sole air traffic controller in the tower at the time had cleared the plane for takeoff, then turned his attention to other duties, and did not see the plane take a wrong turn onto a runway that was too short for it to use safely. The plane crashed on takeoff, killing all 49 passengers and crew.

While the controller’s actions have not been determined as contributing to the crash, the accident brought to light the fact that many control towers in the country were lightly staffed, especially during overnight shifts. It also showed how controllers in these towers were often required to perform both approach control and radar duties. As a consequence, Chairman Oberstar and Representative Peter Costello requested that the Department of Transportation’s Inspector General study the matter.

The report released today states that the Federal Aviation Administration had issued a verbal “guidance” to its towers prior to the Comair crash, calling for towers with both radar and approach control responsibilities, such as Lexington, to have two controllers on duty during overnight shifts. However, that guidance was not uniformly followed.

“We found, however, that because the guidance was verbal, it was misinterpreted and inconsistently applied. As a result, staffing on midnight shifts at combined radar approach control and tower with radar facilities was not uniformly compliant with the guidance established. On the specific date of the Comair accident, three of the 62 facilities that were affected by the policy were staffed with only one controller on the midnight shift. Those facilities were Lexington, Kentucky; Duluth, Minnesota; and Fargo, North Dakota,” the report states.

The report recommends that FAA communicate all future guidance changing or reiterating existing air traffic policies and procedures relating to this issue in writing, and that it develop procedures to ensure that its facilities are in compliance with staffing rules.

“The FAA is charged with maintaining the highest standards of safety in aviation, not safety at the margins,” Oberstar said. “Rep. Costello and I have asked the Inspector General to do a follow-up study to ensure that the FAA is enforcing its own rules, and that directions to tower personnel are properly communicated and followed.”

“What this report makes clear is that the FAA must do a better job of implementing its policies. The IG found that over 11 percent of the midnight shifts analyzed were not in compliance with the two person rule,” Rep. Costello said. “To address this fact, I agree with the IG’s assessment that future operational guidance should be in writing and that the FAA must develop protocols to make sure the guidance is followed. The Aviation Subcommittee will continue to closely monitor this process.”

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